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lN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STAT'E OF UTAH
.\.FOSS PETERSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.

Case No.

BOl~NTIFUL

CITY, A Municipal
Corporation and DAVIS COUNTY,
;\ Body Politic of the State of Utah,

12045

Defendants and Appellarnts.

Respondents' Brief on Appeal
STA'I'F~:\IENT

OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is an action by various property owners to
n•c·o\·er property taxes paid under protest to Bountiful
Cit~· arn1 unlawfully levied and collected by Davis County.
Thc action was brought pursuant to Section 59-11-11,
r'tali Code A11nofated, which provides as follows:
In all cases of leYy of taxes, licenses or other
demands for public re\·enue which is deemed unlawful hy the party whose property is thus taxed,
or from whom such tax or license is demanded
or enforccd, such party may pay under protest
such tax or license, or any part thereof deemed
unlawful, to the officcrs designated and author1

izecl by law to collect the same; and thereupon
the party so paying or his legal representafae
may bring an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction against the officer to whom said tax
or license was paid, or against the state, count1
municipality or other taxing unit on whose b~:
half the same was collected, to recover said tax
or license or any portion thereof paid under pro.
test.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOvVER COURT
The case was tried on December 9, 1969, before the
Honorable John F. Wahlquist, District Judge. The court
found that the taxes in question were improperly levied
and collected and awarded judgment in favor of each of
the respondents for the respective amount of the taxes
paid by them. The judgment was awarded against both
Bountiful City and Davis County.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, Bountiful City, has appealed from the
judgment of the District Court and seeks a reversal of
the judgment. Defendant, Davis County, has not appealed from the judgment. Plaintiffs and respondentR
seek that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed.
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS
As indicated in appellant's brief, this case arises as
a sequel to Jensen i·s. Bountiful City, 20 Utah 2cl 159,
435 P.2d 284, wherein this court held that an annexation ordinance passed by Bountiful City on December
14, 1966, was invalid and of no force aucl cffect.
2

Plaintiffs are all property owners of real property
in the area covered by tlw irlYalid annexation ordinance.
The taxes in question were le,·iecl, assessed and paid
i'or the year 1967. They "·ere imposed and paid prior
to the time this court rendered its opinion in the case
of Jensen rs. Bountiful City, which was on December
12, 19fi7. The Jensen rs. Bountiful City case was pending at the> time the taxes were levied, assessed and paid,
aurl each of the respondent taxpayers paid their propl'l't~- taxes under protest. The manner of protest is set
forth in plaintiffs' Exhibit ''A''. These protests con.~istecl in the main of notations on checks to the effect
that the taxes were paid under protest, and receipted
tax notices showing that the taxes were paid under protest.
Facts set forth in appellant's brief consisting of the
tr>stimo11)· of Grant Peterson, City Manager of Bountiful, attempting to establish the cost of services provided
h1 the area covered by the im·alid annexation are entirrlr irrel0vant to the issues in this appeal. These facts
are fUl'ther inaccurate in that the City merely pro rated
its entirP budget for ;-arious city ser;-ices according to
acreage. It was shO\Yn on cross examination that a suh, ~ta11tial portion of the area in the aimexation territory
is vaeant land (T-11); that the> witness knew of no speeific police calls that were enr made to the area (T-12);
that the witness knew of no specific fire calls ever
macll' to the area (T-12); that no utilities wPl'e fnrnishPd
to thr area ('l'-13, 15, 16); and that no permanent impronments \Yere maclP in the area (T-19). The city
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authorities were aware of the pending litigation auJ
knew that the annexation may he declared invalid (T-13).
There further was no evidence whatsoever that any
expenditure of the City was increased or affected in
any way by reason of the attempted annexation.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A VOID ANNEXATION PROCEEDING
DOES NOT ACQUIRE DE FACTO STATUS
SO AS TO PERMIT A MUNICIPALITY TO
KEEP TAX MONIES IMPROPERLY ASSESSED AND COLLECTED FROM PRO~
ERTY O"WNERS OUTSID.B~ OF ITS CORPORATE BOUNDARIES.
Appellant in its brief has cited several cases holding to the effect that an annexation, otherwise authorized by statute or constitution, can obtain defacto status
where a bona fide attempt is made to annex the terriory but where there has been a failure to conform to
some technical procedural requirement.
It is to be noted from the Jens en vs. Bountiful
City decision, 20 Utah 2d 159, 435 P.2d 284 that the reason for the invalidity of the attempted annexation h~·
Bountiful City in the instant case "·as because of an
insufficient number of signatures on the Petition for
Annexation. Thus it is immediately apparent that this
case does not involve a mere failure to obserYe some
technical requirement, but involves a situation where
clearly there was no statutory authorization to anu~x
the territory at all. This court so found and ordered
4
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the "ordinance he dee la red invalid and enJommg
its enforcement" (20 Utah 2d 162). ·when the lower
romt eHtcred its Amended Judgment, it also stated that
the amwxation ordinallce "is hereby declared and de1l'rminecl to be invalill, null and void and of no force
and effect, and the property dPscrihed in said ordinance
is not, by reason of the ordinance of December 14, 1966,
within the corporate boundaries of Bountiful City."
The cases cited in the annotation relied upon by the
appellant involve situatiolls where the state has failed
to challenge the validity of the annexation. It is true
that in most jurisdictions, the validity of an annexation
('an he challenged only by the state in quo warranto proC'PPdings. 13 A.L.R. 2d 1279. Where such is the case,
the annexation is given de factor status and cannot be
C'ollaterally attacked by a private citizen. In Utah, howr\·er, the remedy of quo warranto is covered by Rule
G:iB(b), Utah Rules of Civil ProcPdure. This rule pro\'ides that the action may be brought by the Attorney
Genpral, and Rule 65B(d) provides that a private persou may bring an action in his own name if the Attorney
Ge1wral fails to do so after notice. Thus, in Utah, the
l'<'mecly of quo warranto, formerly available only to the
'tate, is by statute given to an individual if the Attorney
Oc•neral fails to act. In the instant case, the above proC'l'llure was properly followed, and the validity of the
annPxation ordinance was successfully challenged. This
\rns the equivalent to an attack by the state, and the
Ftah Supreme Court so found in the Jensen vs. Bountiful
('ity case.
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'Vhere a successful quo \varranto attack is mai]p
upon an annexation proceeding, the general law is set
forth in 37 Am. Jnr., Municipal Corporations, Sccti<111
32, which provides as follows:

''If territory is improperly sought to be annexed by a l\Iunicipal Corporation, and the annexation proceedings are successfully attacked
by the state in quo warranto proceedings, the annexation does not acquire a de facto status so as
to give the Municipal Corporation any rights
thereunder.''
To the same effect as the above, only dealing more
specifically with the retention of taxes collected by thP
municipality, is the statement of the general law in Yokley, Municipal Corporatio11s, Section 32 which provides
as follows:
"'Vi th reference to tax monies, it has been
held that where territory wholly unsuitable for
annexation was attempted to he annexed by a
village and such action was successfully attacked
by tlie state in quo warranto proceedings, no ck
facto annexation resulted which would entitle the
am1exi11g village to retain any tax monies obtained from the territory thus attempted to be
annexed.''
In the case of Balka11 rs. Buhl, 158 '.\finn. 271, 19i
N.,V. 266, 3:J A.L.R. 470, it \ms held that where an annexation was successfully attacked in quo warranto proceedings, the village could not hm·e acquired de fado
status and was required to rPtnrn tax monies \Vhich hail
been collrctr1l.
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.\uother case directly in point is Barton cs. Stuckey,
Oklahoma, 248 Pac. 592 which involYed a suit by indi\·irluals against the County Treasurer to recover property taxes paid under protest to the City of Tulsa in
an area which the City had improperly attempted to
annex. The court held that where the property owners
hacl not consented to the annexation and said annexation was, therefore, yoicl, that the property owners could
l'l'l'O\'N the taxes paid under protest in a suit for that
purpose.
'rhe above two cases would seem to be directly applic:ahle to the instant case. Respondents' research has
rewaled no cases where a municipality has been permitted to retain tax monies after a municipal annexation
has been held to be void or invalid.
Based upon the above authorities, it is the position
of plaintiffs that there is no possible way in which the
area in question could acquire any de facto status so
as to r•ntitle the city to keep tax monies that were improperly collected. Section 10-10-57, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 gives the city authority to levy a property
tax only upon property within the city. Inasmuch as
the attempted annexation was slwwn to be wholly void,
the property was ne\·er within the city and, thus, could
ne\·er have been subject to taxation by the city.
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POIN'J.1 II
RESPONDENTS HAVE PROPERLY
COMPLIED WITH THE STATUTE REQUIRING PAYMENT OF TAXES UNDER
PROTEST.
As is noted by the appellant in its hrief, Section
59-11-11, Utah Code Annotated, requires payment unclrr
protest before an action can be commenced under said
section for the reco\·ery of the taxes.
The statute does not require any particular form of
protest, nor does it require that any grounds be stated
in the protest. Statutes of this iiature are not umommon, and the general law with respect to the manner
of protest is set forth as follows in 51 Am. J ur., Taxation, Section 1189 :
"\Vhere there is no such express requirement in the statute, it is generally held that a
protest need not set out the grounds upon which
it is claimed that the tax is invalid."
In Murdock rs. JJfurdock, 38 Utah 373, 111 Pac. 330,
it was stated that no particular form of protest is required hy Section 59-11-11, nor is it required that the
protest be in writing; it is sufficient if the payments
are made under an oral prntest and noted by the treasurer 011 the tax records. The court went 011 further to
say that "\Yhen the statute prescribes no special comlitions in making a protest, it \1·onld seem that the courts
can require none.''
Certai11ly it \\'Oulcl seem that if an oral protest can
satisfy the statute, there sl1onld he no question about
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the written protests of these respondents. These written protests consisted of notations on checks together
\rith the treasurer's receipted tax notices showing that
the taxes were paid under protest. Appellant in its brief
states that there is no evidence that the treasurer noted
thr protests on his record or noted the portions of the
tax being protested or the reasons for the protests. HowC\'er, there was also no evidence offered to show that
the treasurer did not make such notations; and in any
rrent, the written notations of the treasurer on his own
records are not a required part of the plaintiffs' proof.
j.t the time the taxes were paid under protest, a lawsuit
was pending in Davis County wherein the validity of
the annexation was being challenged, and it is unreasonable to assume that the treasurer was unaware of the
reasons for the protest.
It further should be pointed out that the Statute
of Limitations for recovery of taxes paid under protest
(Section 78-12-31, Utah Code Annotated) is only six (6)
months. Thus there is no merit to the argument that
taxpayers can pay taxes under a general protest and
leave the taxing authorities in a state of uncertainty
for long periods of time.

The statements quoted in appellant's brief from the
case of Neilson vs. San Pete County, 40 Utah 560, 123
Pac. 334 to the effect that a taxpayer must designate
the portion of the tax paid under protest are taken completely out of context. In the Neilson case, there was
no protest at all made by the taxpayer and still the court
recognized that recovery could be had under Section
9

2642, C'om piled Lalt's of 1.907 (now 59-10-14, Utal1 Codr
Annotated) which section docs not require protest. In
the instant case, an actual written protest of the entire
property tax was ma<lc hy each of the respondents. A
protest of the whole tax certai11ly would include all portions thereof.
·wh0n a private individual ill0gally takes money
from another person, there is no r0qnirement in la'r that
a protest he made before suing for recovery. The requirement of protest has no particular sacred significance except that Section 59-11-11, Utah Code A mrntatcrl
requires that a prot0st be ma<1e. It would seem there
is no reason whatsoever why the court should enlarge
upon the requirement of protest hy imposing additional
conditions that are not set out in the statute.

CONCLUSION
Based upon all of the authorities as cited herein,
it is respectfully suhmitterl that the judgment of the
trial court he affirmed.
Respeetfnll:· submitted,

ARl\ISTRO?\G, RAWLINGS, WEST
& SCHAERRER
Da Yid J<--;. \Yest
Attunieys for Plai11tiffs
and RcspoJ1deuts
1300 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lah Cit:·, Utah 84111
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